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The so-called ‘global imbalances’, their source and remedy have been a frequent topic of debate through 
the years leading up to the global ﬁ  nancial crisis and more recently. This article contends that the debate 
should focus less on the role of the exchange rate in inﬂ  uencing trade ﬂ  ows, and more on savings and 
investment imbalances. In particular, the reasons behind the ‘uphill’ ﬂ  ow of capital deserve greater 
consideration. A long-term solution to the global imbalances will require not only some exchange rate 
adjustments, but also changes to saving and investment patterns in both surplus and deﬁ  cit countries. 
This is achievable, but it will not be an overnight process.
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1| WHAT ARE THE ‘IMBALANCES’?
The term ‘global imbalances’ is generally interpreted 
as referring to large current account positions, with 
opposite signs, across countries. The current account 
position can be viewed in several ways: as the difference 
between a country’s income and its absorption; as the 
difference between the goods, services and income it 
sends abroad and those it acquires from abroad; or as 
the difference between its saving and its investment 
(that is, its net absorption of ﬁ  nancial capital). These 
concepts all measure the same thing. In the years 
leading up to the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis, a number 
of key countries were running large current account 
positions –some positive and some negative. 
Large current account positions –or, put another way, 
large cross border ﬂ  ows of capital– are not historically 
unusual. What has generated concern has been the 
size and persistence of these current account positions 
over the past decade or so and the fact that they 
involve some of the world’s largest economies. Over 
this period, the emerging Asian economies along with 
Japan, Germany and the oil exporting countries have 
tended to run large current account surpluses while 
the United States and a number of other advanced 
economies, particularly English-speaking ones, have 
run persistent current account deﬁ  cits. 
2| ARE THEY REALLY ‘IMBALANCES’?
The term ‘imbalance’ implies that the situation 
described is either undesirable or unstable. However, 
there is nothing intrinsically wrong with either 
cross-border ﬂ  ows of goods and services or of capital 
and there is nothing inherently virtuous about having 
a current account position of zero –or ‘in balance’. 
Indeed, a beneﬁ  t of globalisation is that savers can 
seek the highest return, allowing for risk, on their 
savings available in the global market. The corollary 
of this is that capital is able to ﬂ  ow to where it will 
be most productively employed, leading to higher 
global growth than otherwise.
What is unusual about these capital ﬂ  ows is that 
they do not seem to have ﬂ  owed in the direction 
of greater potential returns. As some have put it, 
the capital has ﬂ  owed ‘uphill’ from the emerging or 
developing economies to the advanced economies. 
In particular, East Asian economies experienced 
signiﬁ  cant capital outﬂ  ows while the United States 
and a number of other English-speaking advanced 
economies experienced very large capital inﬂ  ows. 
This article focuses on developments in saving and 
investment in the emerging economies of East Asia 
–not because these were the only economies with 
large current account positions, but because these 
positions were both large and of the opposite sign to 
that predicted by economic theory.
3| WHY DID THE IMBALANCES OCCUR? 
Much of the debate concerning the reasons for the 
existence of global imbalances focuses on exchange 
rates. The argument runs that a key group of current 
account surplus countries have reached that position 
by following a mercantilist strategy of maintaining 
an undervalued exchange rate in order to promote 
exports. Proponents of this view argue that the 
impressive growth in the foreign exchange reserves 
of East Asian central banks is indicative of efforts to 
prevent appreciation of their currency. 
Exchange rates and intervention unquestionably 
played a role in the build-up of these imbalances to the 
extent that the current account imbalances would have 
been neither so large nor so persistent if exchange 
rates had been allowed to respond freely to the supply 
and demand forces implied by the current account. 
But focussing on the role of exchange rates in 
inﬂ  uencing countries’ export competitiveness ignores 
another aspect of this story. It is also important to 
consider the role of saving and investment behaviour. 
Developing countries tend to have high saving rates due 
to a number of factors, including minimal social safety 
nets and underdeveloped ﬁ  nancial markets providing 
limited opportunities to invest household savings. 
From a growth perspective, developing countries 
would ideally employ these savings and any extra 
funds available from overseas to boost investment (or 
indeed consumption, where this is particularly low). 
This was the case in eastern European countries in the 
years leading up to the ﬁ  nancial crisis, where a rise 
in investment was funded largely by capital inﬂ  ows.
The economies of East Asia have historically had high 
rates of saving. In the years leading up to the Asian 
ﬁ  nancial crisis, the high share of saving was matched or 
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proﬁ  ts in the state-owned enterprises (which were not 
required to pass dividends on to the government) led to 
higher corporate saving; and government saving also 
increased. The notable divergence in Chinese saving 
and investment ratios in the period from 2005 onwards 
opened up a signiﬁ  cant current account surplus. In the 
three years since 2004, the current account surplus 
tripled as a percentage of GDP.
In the period from the end of the 1990s, for differing 
reasons, therefore, East Asian saving ratios exceeded 
investment ratios. The ‘excess’ saving was in the order 
of 5 per cent of GDP for much of East Asia, though it 
increased to around 10 per cent of GDP in China in the 
year before the global ﬁ  nancial crisis. This substantial 
increase in domestic saving over investment in 
East Asia, supplemented by sizeable excess saving in 
Japan, Germany and various oil exporting countries led 
to an ex ante excess of global saving over investment. 
The substantial accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves by East Asian economies in the ﬁ  ve years or 
so leading up to the ﬁ  nancial crisis exerted downward 
pressure on the yield of ‘safe’ assets, particularly 
in the United States. The very easy monetary 
policy stance of the major advanced countries that 
characterised some parts of the past decade was also 
of course a factor in lowering interest rates. Excess 
savings from surplus countries ﬂ  owed to markets 
where demand for it was most sensitive to interest 
rate changes –that is, the United States and some 
other mainly English-speaking countries.
even exceeded by strong investment (Chart 1). During 
and immediately after the crisis, however, investment 
dropped substantially as a share of GDP in a number 
of East Asian countries and has remained well below 
total saving in the years since. In retrospect, it seems 
that earlier levels of investment were not sustainable, 
or that some of the investment was of the wrong kind. 
The fall in investment (in both absolute terms and as a 
share of GDP) in most East Asian economies –largely 
a result of the crisis– combined with little change in 
saving ratios was reﬂ  ected in persistent current account 
surpluses from 1998 onwards. Policies played a role too 
because many countries decided –and were advised– to 
build higher levels of reserves as a form of self-insurance 
against volatility in capital ﬂ  ows. But more understanding 
is needed of why investment rates have remained so low. 
In China, the story is somewhat different. Having 
not been badly affected by the Asian crisis, Chinese 
investment exhibited a steep upward trajectory over 
the period 2000 to 2005 (Chart 2). Thereafter it fell 
back slightly as a share of GDP as signs of overheating 
in domestic property markets encouraged authorities 
to introduce measures to curtail dwelling investment, 
amongst other things, but has since surged even higher. 
This rise in investment has, however, been surpassed 
by the increase in its saving ratio, which reached a 
peak of over 50 per cent of GDP in 2008. This sharp rise 
in saving is explained by higher saving rates across all 
sectors of the economy: a number of structural reforms 
encouraged increased saving by households; strong 
Chart 1
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a) Developing and newly industrialised Asian economies excluding China 
and India.
Sources: IMF, RBA, World Bank.
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Sources: IMF, RBA, World Bank.
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Unfortunately, much of this capital was not well 
used. The prolonged period of low interest rates 
drove investors in search of higher returns while the 
apparent stability of the low interest rate environment 
worked to convince investors that these higher-return 
investments were in fact less risky than they were. 
This tendency grew to the point where investors were 
purchasing complex products without understanding 
the associated risks –or indeed the composition of 
those same products. The seemingly endless supply 
of cheap capital also encouraged investors to take on 
greater leverage in the hope of enhancing their returns. 
Compounding these difficulties, there was poor 
regulation and supervision of ﬁ  nancial institutions in a 
number of countries. The growth of perverse incentives 
relating to ﬁ  nancial products went unchecked: credit 
was extended to households that could not afford to pay 
it back and investors were sold products that had been 
created by parties with vested interests. Moreover, 
ﬁ  nancial institutions in a number of countries grew so 
large that the cost to the home government of bailing 
them out placed severe pressure on public ﬁ  nances. 
Ultimately, this ended badly. The explicit costs 
relating to the ﬁ  nancial crisis are obvious, but when 
we consider the opportunity cost of this use of capital, 
the cost is even greater. Much of the capital appears 
to have ended up fuelling asset bubbles in some of 
the advanced economies, while it could have been 
used to boost productivity and thus standards of living 
in developing or emerging economies. 
4| WHERE TO FROM HERE?
To some extent, these ‘imbalances’ have been 
reduced over the past few years. Households 
in the United States have recently been saving a 
greater portion of their income, spending less on 
goods and services for immediate consumption 
(including imports). The increase in public spending 
has, however, outstripped the increased saving of 
households and led to an ongoing fall in aggregate 
saving. In Asia, and especially in China, private 
consumption has held up strongly despite the 
weakness in key export markets, providing evidence 
that these economies may be becoming a little less 
export-dependent and a little more self-reliant in 
sustaining growth. There has also been some currency 
appreciation in these countries since the crisis, 
although in a few cases Asian currencies remain 
below their pre-crisis levels. These developments 
have worked to reduce the current account positions 
of China and the United States in particular from their 
elevated levels (in absolute terms) of the immediate 
pre-crisis years.
This reduction in imbalances has, however, occurred 
in an environment where many countries in the 
advanced world have fallen a long way below 
full employment. Some of the effects mentioned 
above are potentially transitory in nature and may 
reverse once there is evidence of sustained growth. 
For example, although households in the United States 
appear to have saved more during this crisis, the 
important question is whether, once growth picks up, 
households will become less cautious and resume 
their previous spending behaviour. The task then is 
to try to have a more balanced allocation of saving 
around the world at a position of full employment. 
A long-term solution will require a higher degree 
of international co-operation than was observed in 
the past. It will require more ﬂ  exibility in exchange 
rates for key emerging market countries such as 
China. It may require lower saving from disposable 
income in some Asian countries, possibly through 
higher wages. But it would be desirable for it to 
involve higher investment rates in some cases. 
Finally, it will also require higher rates of saving 
out of current income than a few years ago in key 
advanced economies, including by households in 
some cases and by governments in most cases.
So it is likely that a full resolution of the imbalances 
will take quite some time. Deep-seated attitudes to the 
desirable rate of saving, degree of exchange rate ﬂ  exibility 
and extent of ﬁ  nancial account openness are likely to 
be slow to change. A sustained fall in saving ratios in 
East Asia will depend to some degree on further increases 
in living standards and the extension of social safety nets. 
Moving towards more exchange rate ﬂ  exibility and 
ﬁ  nancial account openness will require the continued 
development of domestic ﬁ  nancial systems to allow for 
the appropriate management of risk and the channelling 
of capital to productive rather than ‘speculative’ ends. 
A sustained increase in American household saving 
that endures into the next boom period will require a 
distinct change in attitudes to consumption; an increase 
in public saving in the United States will also be needed. 
These changes are not impossible to achieve –but it 
will not be an overnight process.
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